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In this paper, we study to what extent a movie’s box office receipts are affected by the 
temporal distribution of rival films. We propose a theoretical model that analyses the 
effects of past, present and future releases on a film’s results. Using this model we can 
analyse how rivals’ release dates impact on others’ box office revenues. This theoretical 
model also allows us to carry out some comparative statics by changing some relevant 
parameters such as time depreciation, film quality or the timeline of exhibition. We 
have tested the empirical implications of this  model using information on the films 
released in five countries: the USA, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Spain. 
In order to maintain a degree of homogeneity, we have constructed an unbalanced panel 
consisting  of  films  that  were  released  in  at  least  three  of  these  countries.  The 
geographical dimension of our data set allows us to use panel data techniques to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity among the films released. This allows us to control for 
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1.  Introduction  
The motion pictures industry has received increasing attention from academics 
in recent years due to several features which make it a particularly interesting topic of 
study.  First,  the  motion  picture  industry  can  be  defined  as  a  differentiated  product 
oligopoly. All movies are different by definition and the distribution market is also 
controlled by a small group of companies: the major film studios. Second, due to this 
heterogeneity and the fact that products in this industry are for immediate consumption, 
the life cycle for movies differs significantly from that of typical consumer products, 
being characterized by a box-office peak in the first week of release that is followed by 
an exponential decay pattern over time as new films enter the exhibition market and the 
value of the film declines. In general, between 60% and 70% of film revenues at the 
box-office are collected in the first three weeks,
1 so that motion pictures exhibition is a 
short life-cycle industry. Third, cinema demand is characterized by  large fluctuations 
along the year, with high peaks in certain weeks. In this context, when distributors 
believe that a film  may be a blockbuster they will try to release it  in  high-demand 
periods as they know that one month’s revenues during these periods can produce box 
office  sales  equivalent  to  several  months  in  low-demand  phases.
2  However, when 
studios try to maximize box-office revenues they face an interesting strategic problem, 
namely the trade-off between trying to capture as much of the revenues as possible 
during the peak demand  period while avoiding head-to-head competition for the same 
audience. This head-to-head competition is especially critical in the first few weeks of 
running a film as  the whole commercial life of a film  depends on the  performance 
during the first weeks.
3 Moreover, this head-to-head competition cannot be alleviated by 
reducing prices as ticket prices are very similar within each local market  (Orbach & 
Einav, 2007)  and there  are  no price differences among films exhibited in a cinema 
theatre at a given moment.
4 
                                                 
1 See Krider & Weinberg (1998) and Krider, Li, Liu, & Weinberg (2005). 
2 See Moul & Shugan (2005), Vogel (2007) and Radas & Shugan (1998). 
3 For instance, a good performance during the first weekend might create a positive word-of-mouth effect 
capturing the attention of the public, media and exhibitors (De Vany, 2004). 
4 We can observe some price discrimination but this is in terms of days, seasons or consumer groups, not 
among movies. The  exception is the case of 3 -D movies but  these can be considered  as a different 
commodity. 3 
 
Considering all these features that lead to a rapid and frequent release of new 
movies,  the  release  date  in  the  motion  picture  industry  is  an  essential  variable  in 
distributors’  strategies.  The  commercial  success  of  a  film  depends  crucially  on  the 
release date, partly because a movie’s opening weekend is usually the most profitable 
but also because movies that are released close together are likely to impose negative 
effects on each other’s revenues (Corts, 2001). 
In this framework, this paper analyses the role of temporal competition inside 
the  movie  distribution  market  and  its  effect  on  box  office  receipts.  The  economic 
performance of movies is an increasing research field in Economics but most of the 
literature  is  focused  on  how  box  office  revenues  are  determined  by  a  series  of 
explanatory variables related to the movie’s classification (sequel, rating, and genre), 
production features (budget, star and director power), quality (critics’ reviews, award 
nominations  and  academy  awards),  and  distribution  characteristics  (advertising, 
marketing  expenditure  and  opening  screens).
5  Previous papers have generally used  
multivariate linear regression to predict film performance measured by two different 
dependent variables: cumulative domestic rentals and the total length of run of each 
film. Thus,  Sochay (1994) found that competition, measured by a concentration ratio 
for a specific film, has a significant effect on box -office performance.  Jedidi et al. 
(1998) analysed competitive intensity during a movie's opening weekend and over its 
run  and  identified  four  different  types  of  movies.  Elberse  and  Eliashberg   (2003) 
analysed competition for screens (i.e., screens allocated by exhibitors) and for revenues 
(i.e., attention from audiences) using weekly data from the US, France, Germany, Spain 
and the UK. They distinguished between new releases and on-going movies and found 
that competition is stronger among movies with similar  characteristics and that the 
longer the movies are on release, the lesser the competition effect. Moreover, they 
observe that competition for revenue is a strong predictor of revenues throughout a 
movie's run. Movie performance is also hurt by simultaneous releases of the same genre 
and rating (Ainslie, Dreze, & Zufryden, 2005) and by the release of other films with a 
similar target audience (Basuroy, Desai, & Talukdar, 2006).
6 More recently, Calantone 
et al.  (2010)  have estimated a model using  weekly data that  accounts  directly and 
                                                 
5 See Hadida (2009) and McKenzie (2010) for a summary of this literature. 
6  However, Basuroy et al. (2006) have found that on-going films’ competition for screens has a positive 
effect on weekly box office receipts and screen coverage. 4 
 
indirectly (through the numbers of theatres) for competitive effects on the performance 
of a movie. They conclude that on-going (i.e. incumbent) movies have a higher negative 
effect than new releases. 
We develop a theoretical framework to examine in detail the competition effect, 
i.e., the effect of other film releases on the total box-office revenues of a particular film. 
This model allows us to test to what extent the temporal competition has asymmetric 
effects,  i.e.  whether  past,  present  and  future  rival  releases  have  similar  or  different 
effects on a particular film’s outcome. Our theoretical model also shows that modelling 
the competition effect on total box-office revenues is an empirical issue and cannot be 
easily inferred from the (estimated) effects on weekly box-office revenues. Indeed, we 
show that the competition effect on total box-office revenues depends on several key 
characteristics of the film market such as the relative quality of the movies, the number 
of weeks films are on screens (i.e. the decay rate), and the underlying seasonal pattern.  
The above issues are of crucial relevance to film studios and distributors because 
they often carry out intense market research before releasing their movies in order to 
discover audience’s preferences and anticipate market responses. Our theoretical model 
could help them to improve release timing decisions through knowledge of the payoff 
matrix of the release game, comparing the gains of avoiding competition by opening 
before a rival or by delaying the release and opening later. Unlike previous papers, our 
empirical analysis uses cumulative data rather than weekly figures because distributors 
are more interested in total revenues.
7 Another distinctive characteristic of our paper is 
the longitudinal nature of our analysis. We have collected data on movies released 
between 2000 and 2009 in five countries, namely the United States and the four largest 
European motion pictures markets (United Kingdom, France, Germany and Spain). The 
geographical dimension  allows us to use panel data techniques to control  for  the 
heterogeneous nature of movies. Hence, our paper contributes to two research fields in 
motion  picture  economic  literature:  international   comparisons  among  exhibition 
                                                 
7  We  focus  on  box  office  revenues  as  distribution  and  marketing  costs  at  this  time  are  sunk  costs. 
Additionally, it is known that nontheatrical revenues depend on movie's box office revenues and the 
importance  of  nontheatrical  revenues  is  growing,  especially  for  DVD,  PPV  and  TV  (Ginsburgh  & 
Weyers, 1999; Hennig-Thurau, Houston, & Walsh, 2006).   5 
 
markets  and  the  control  of  unobserved  heterogeneity  by  application  of  panel  data 
techniques
8. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we lay out the theoretical 
model. In section 3 we describe the data base used and in section 4 the empirical model 
to be estimated is outlined. In Section  5 the principal results are presented. The final 
section concludes. 
 
2.  The benchmark model 
In this section we propose a demand model to assess the competition effect of 
other films on total box-office revenues, where these revenues for a particular movie 
depend  on  primary  demand,  the  number  of  other  films  and  (own  and  rival)  movie 
characteristics. Our model benefits especially from Krider and Weinberg (1998). These 
authors model competition between two films using a share attraction framework and 
conduct an equilibrium analysis of the release date timing game.
9 Although temporal 
decisions are strategic choices in movie industry, it should be noted that our model does 
not explain  how  the actual release  date  is determined.  We simply try to provide a 
theoretical framework that shows that: i) modelling the competition effect of other films 
on  total  box-office  revenues  is  not  obvious  and  cannot  be  easily  inferred  from 
(estimated) effects on weekly box-office revenues; and ii) the final effect of competing 
films is an empirical issue because it depends on several key characteristics of the film 
market  such  as  the  relative  quality  of  the  movies,  the  number  of  weeks  films  on 
exhibition  (i.e.  the  decay  rate),  and  the  underlying  seasonal  pattern.
10  In particular, 
following Einav (2007), Krider & Weinberg (1998) and Moul (2007), we assume that 
the revenues of a particular movie i at time t , Ri(t), can be written using a logit function 
as: 
                                                 
8The great majority of the studies reviewed use cross-sectional data from a single country and they try to 
use as many covariates as possible to control for heterogeneity across movies. However, they cannot 
control for unobserved heterogeneity. One exception is Craig et al. (2005), which follows a panel data 
approach. 
9 They also concluded that a primary concern in timing releases is to stay away from movies that have the 
same target audience. 
10 Modelling release decisions is a difficult task due to two important characteristics of the film market 
that should be properly addressed: (1) releasing decisions are discrete and (2) film heterogeneity imposes 
large asymmetries among agents. Corts (2001) tried to deal with these problems by analysing   the time 
gap among movies released in the same period  and estimating a reduced form model. More recently, 
Einav (2010) explains the observed release date  decisions as the equilibrium outcome of a sequential -
move game model with private information. 6 
 
                        
     
                      (1) 
where t stands for time (week); j stands for all the movies on screen at time t except 
movie i; D(t) is the primary demand at week t and captures the underlying seasonality of 
total demand throughout the year; Si(t) is the share of movie i  , which in turn depends 
on its perceived quality or attraction, Ai(t), and the attraction of competing films, Aj(t).  
As shown by Moul & Shugan (2005) and Einav (2007), the logit demand function for 
cinema  can  be  obtained  from  a  utility  maximization  problem  where  it  is  assumed, 
following the literature on discrete choice models of demand, that consumers choose the 
movie  that  yields  the  highest  utility.
11  It should be noted that  in order  to  keep the 
theoretical model as simple as possible we do not allow for  market expansion effects 
due to more or better movies (see Einav, 2007). Therefore, we must interpret our model 
as a reduced form expression of demand where the expansion market effects have been 
“solved  out”
12  and  the  estimated  impact  of  variables  on  demand  should  then  be 
interpreted as equilibrium effects.
13  
According to (1), total box office of movie i can be written as follow: 
            
  
                  
  
                    (2) 
where ci and Ti are the opening week and the last week of exhibition of movie i. The 
attraction of this movie is zero before opening at t<ci and after leaving the screen at 
t>Ti.  As is customary in the literature, we next  assume that  its attraction decreases 
exponentially over time, where ci ≤ t ≤ Ti. Therefore, the attraction function Ai(t) can be 
written as:   
         
                                          
                               
                           
        (3) 
                                                 
11 Einav (2007) also includes a term that captures seasonal changes in demand but, unlike in equation (1), 
this term is not separable from movies’ shares as they are defined with respect an “extended” market that 
includes an outside good. We follow, however, the same strategy as Einav (2007) to estimate seasonal 
changes in demand, i.e. by using a set of weekly dummy variables under the assumption that the demand 
seasonality is stable over time.  
12 Note, however, that our model is equivalent to Einav’s (2007)  model when either the expansion effect 
is maximum or the substitution between movies and other goods is large (i.e. his parameter σ is zero). 
13This strategy has been followed by Moul (2007) and Einav (2007) to address the potential endogeneity 
problem regarding the number of screens and advertising.  7 
 
Following Krider and Weinberg (1998), the attraction depends on (i) the initial 
quality or marketability, i, which is the capacity of the movie to capture the audience’s 
interest  before  the  release  based  on  factors  such  as  advertisingt,  cast,  script,  genre, 
special effects, etc.; and (ii) the depreciation rate or playability, βi, which is the ability to 
keep the audience after its release and which depends on several factors including the 
word of mouth effect.
14  For notational ease,  hereafter  we normalize all weeks with 
respect to the week of release of movie i. That is, t=0 when the film i is released, and 
hence ci=0. We also assume that rivals’ movies (j) have the same depreciation rate βj 
and quality j. We finally assume that all movies are Tj weeks on screen (i.e. movies 
released Tj weeks before or after also compete with the movie i, affecting its revenues). 
We  focus  our  analysis  on  the  most  potentially  harmful  films,  those  released 
during the period from two weeks before to two weeks after movie i’s release. In order 
to  keep  the  model  as  simple  as  possible,  we  assume  that  the  pool  of  competitors 
released in t<-2 (and t>2) is the same every week and equal to n. Let us rewrite the 
attraction of movie i’s competing films in its opening week as follows: 
                     
                  
                 
              
        (4) 
This expression can be approximated as follows: 
                                                     
         (5) 
where nh represents the number of releases in the week h. It is worth nothing that the 
term in brackets is actually      times the sum of terms of a geometric progression of 
ratio     . Hence, the attraction of competing films in (5) is equivalent to: 
                
  
      
      
  
     
               
         (6) 
Inserting (6) into (1), we can write the revenues of movie i in its opening week as: 
                                                 
14 The term (t-ci) captures two effects (see, for instance, Einav, 2007). First, most people watch a movie 
only once, and the potential market shrinks over time. Second, most people prefer watching a movie 
earlier in its release. As Moul (2005) pointed out, this term can be viewed as a way to capture a saturation 
effect and consumer preferences for “fresh” products, which are standard in the marketing literature.  8 
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Let us move on to revenues in the following weeks. The revenues of the movie i in the 
week following the release are: 
            




      
      
  
     
      
            
          
      (8) 
Regarding the transition from (7) to (8), three comments are in order. First, the 
attractiveness  of  movie  i  is  depreciated  one  period,  i.e.               .  Second,  n1 
movies released one week after movie i  are added to the set of competing movies. And 
third, the competitors released in Tj. disappear from the pool of less harmful movies, i.e. 
only  the  competitors  released  in  (or  later  than)  Tj-1  remain  on  screen.  The  above 
rotation process, where new movies are added while other movies as dropped from the 
set  of  competing  movies,  is  included  in  the  model  in  order  to  imitate  the  dynamic 
pattern  in  a  real-world  cinema  market  and  is  taken  into  account  to  examine  the 
following week’s revenues. Following the same strategy, the revenues in the second and 
third weeks can be written respectively as: 
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and 
            




      
      
  
     
      
            
              
  
    (10) 
While equation (9) is just equation (8) moved one week, in equation (10) we 
have  treated  the  number  of  competitors  released  in  t>2  (see  the  last  term  of  the 
denominator) separately because they are less harmful than previous movies released 
closer to movie i. Now, and as we did with movies released in t<-2, we assume for 
simplicity that the pool of competitors released in t>2 is the same every week and equal 
to n. Consequently, the revenues after four weeks can be written as: 9 
 
            




      
     
  
     
      
            
               
        
   
    (11) 
and so on. Summing up weekly revenues, total revenue for movie i can be expressed as 
follows: 
      




          
      
  
     
      
             
          
 
                                    
 




          
      
  
     
      
             
             
   
    
        
  
     
 
    
   
 
           
     
             
    
          
   
    
        
  
     
  
                                           
  (12) 
This equation indicates that the success of a particular movie i can be written as 
a  function  of  the  decay-adjusted  quality  of  movie  i;  the  number  and  quality  of 
competing movies that were released before, simultaneously with or after movie i; and 
the seasonality of overall demand for cinema over time. If Di stands for the average 
demand  level  during  movie  i’s  time  exhibition,  movie  i’s  cumulative  box  office 
revenues can be written as: 
                                                (13) 
In the next section we show that the relative effect on movie i’s revenues of 
competing films released, say, one week before or one week after movie i’s release is 
ambiguous. Moreover, the sign of the gap between both effects might change notably 
from one observation to the next as it depends on the quality of the movies, decay rates, 
and the underlying seasonal pattern. 
Competition Effects 
In this section we use the model developed in the previous section to carry out 
some  comparative  statics  that,  by  changing  some  relevant  parameters  such  as  time 
depreciation, film quality or timeline of exhibition, allow us to analyse the effect on 
total revenues of contemporaneous, past and future extra movies. We first compute the 10 
 
effect on movie i’s total revenues of an extra movie released in t=0, i.e. the same week 
as movie i. This effect can be computed by taking the derivative of weekly revenues 
with respect to n0. Regarding the revenues in the opening week, the derivative with 
respect to n0 is: 
        
   
       
   
       
 
  
                             (14) 
where C(t) stands for the sum of attractions of all movies on screen during week t, i.e. 
the denominator in equation (1). Regarding the following weeks, the derivative with 
respect to n0 is:  
      
   
       
 
      
       
 
      
                            (15) 
By adding the derivatives for all weeks that the movie remains on screen we 
obtain the effect on total revenues: 
   
   
 
        
  
 
   
                   
  
          (16) 
If an extra movie is released one week before movie i’s release, i.e. in t=-1, the 
effect on total revenues is:
15 
   
    
 
        
  
 
    
                       
  
                       
    
  
    (17) 
where Sj
* is the hypothetical share of movie j if it were released at the same time as 
movie  i  and  the  competing  movies  in  week  t  did  not  change.  If  an  extra  movie  is 
released one week earlier, in t=-2, the effect on total revenues is: 
   
    
 
        
  
 
    
                       
  
                      
  
    
      (18) 
When a competing movie is released one week after the release of movie i, the 
opening week’s revenues are not affected by this new movie. It might, however, have a 
                                                 
15 For notational ease, we assume hereafter that any movie released before movie i affects the whole of 
movie i’s running period. The results are loosely the same because the effect on later revenues tends to 
zero if Ti is long enough.  11 
 
strong effect on revenues in the following weeks. If an extra movie is released in t=1, 
the effect on total revenues is: 
   
   
 
        
  
 
   
                         
  
                     
    
  
     (19) 
And if it is released two weeks later: 
   
   
 
        
  
 
   
                       
  
                       
    
  
     (20) 
The  equations  above  suggest,  as  expected,  that  the  effect  of  an  additional 
competitor on total revenues of a movie depends on its date of release. However, if we 
move the date of release of our competitor, the evolution of the competition might be 
intuitive  or  counterintuitive.  For  instance,  equations  (16)  and  (17)  suggest  that  if  a 
competing movie is released the same week its effect is  always higher than if it is 
released one or more weeks earlier.
16 However, comparing equations (16) and (19) we 
cannot affirm that the effect of a movie released a week later is  always less than if it is 
release the same week. This only can be asserted when the underlying demand is not 
increasing.
17 
Similar comments arise if we compare the effects of a particular film released 
just one week earlier or one week later. The effect on  the revenues of movie i when a 
rival movie j is released one week before or one week after is not symmetric. Indeed, 
when  a  competing  movie  is  released  earlier,  it  competes  against  movie  i  from  the 
beginning.  If it were released one week later, the opening  week’s revenues  are not 
affected by this new movie, though it might have stronger effect on revenues in the 
following weeks. Computing the difference between both effects we get: 
                                                 
16 Note that this result does not fit with the results obtained by Calantone et al (2010).  
17It is straightforward to show this result if we assume that  Ti is long enough, so that the difference 
between (16) and (19) is approximated by:  
   
   
 
   
   
                                    
    
         
The  sign  of  this  difference  is  ambiguous  when  primary  demand  is  increasing  because  movie  shares 
always decrease as time increases. 
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or more specifically: 
   
   
 
   
    
             
                        
    
  
                (22) 
  We arrive at an expression in which the first term is positive and the second 
negative.  For  this  reason,  we  cannot  affirm  anything  about  which  one  is  higher. 
Moreover, using some simulation results it is easy to show that net value varies a lot 
depending on the magnitude of several key characteristics of the film market, such us 
the relative quality of the movies, the number of weeks films are on screens(i.e. the 
decay rate), and the underlying seasonal pattern. 
 
3.  Sample and data base 
This section summarizes the data we used to perform our empirical analysis. The 
sample  consists  of  box  office  revenues  for  movies  released  in  five  countries  from 
January 1
st, 2000 to December 31
st, 2009. We have collected the information provided 
by A. C. Nielsen EDI on movies released in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Spain, France and Germany. From this original information, we have selected those 
movies released in at least three of these countries. Our eventual database incorporates 
2,811 movies and 11,908 valid observations. This database has a panel data structure 
where  the  common  time  dimension  has  been  substituted  by  a  country  (spatial) 
dimension. In order to arrive at this structure we first needed to match the movies across 
countries because many movies were released with different titles in each country. This 
was  done  by  using  the  information  provided  by  Internet  Movie  Database  web  site 
(www.imdb.com). 
For each movie and country, our dataset  includes  the following information: 
corresponding title in each country, the official release dates, total box-office revenues, 
number of theaters on the release date, maximum number of theaters counted for a film 
over the course of its run, the distributors, and the MPAA rating. In the case of France 
we have total attendance instead of total box-office revenues.  13 
 
 
4.  The Empirical Model 
According to equation (13) above, the box office performance of a particular 
movie i can be written as a function of the film’s own characteristics film (i.e. αi, βi), as 
well as the number (n0, n-1, n-2 …) and characteristics (αj, βj) of competing movies that 
were  released  before,  simultaneously  with  or  after  movie  i,  and  the  seasonality  of 
overall demand (Di). Considering all these determinants, the empirical counterpart of 
equation (13) can be written as: 
                                                                        
 
      
                                  
  
                    (23) 
where subscript c stands for country, subscript w identifies film i’s opening week, and 
εic is the error term. The movie-specific constant term αi captures unobserved film-
specific heterogeneity, such as its budget, marketing costs, genre, star, critic reviews, 
and distributor, as well as its intrinsic quality. This heterogeneity cannot be modeled 
with cross-section data. However, it can be analyzed under the structure of panel data, 
and this is one of the main contributions of our paper. In accordance with the main 
features  of  our  dataset,  we  have  constructed  a  panel  data  model  where  the  time 
dimension has been substituted by a country dimension. 
The  dependent  variable  MarketShareic  is  the  log  of  film  i’s  total  box-office 
revenues in each country, normalized by the country’s annual box-office revenues. This 
normalization  allows  us  to  control  for  the  country-size  effects,  changes  in  cinema 
revenues over time, inflation and changes in the relative prices of movie tickets during 
the period.
18 
  Following  the  previous  literature,  as  explanatory  variables  we  include  the 
maximum weekly theatres count for a movie  i  over  the  course  of  its  theatre  run, 
MaxThtsic, which provides a proxy for the attractiveness of the film and other qualitative 
features  such as budget,  the presence of stars,  advertising,  and also  the distribution 
strategy and especially its marketing intensity i.e. its ex-ante competitive intensity or 
power  (see  Elberse  &  Eliashberg,  2003  and  Hadida;  2009).  In  addition,  since  the 
relevant geographical market in the movie theatre industry is local in nature (Davis, 
                                                 
18 Due to data limitations, the market share in France has been computed using total attendance instead of 
total box-office revenues. 14 
 
2006), it may also be viewed as an “inverse” measure of customer transaction costs. 
Both reasons imply an expected positive coefficient for this variable.
19 
  To examine in detail the competition effect  of (past, present  and future) rival 
films  on  total  box-office  revenues,  we  include  a  set  of  variables,  RivThts(r)ic,  that 
measures the opening-week theatres of all the rivals of the movie i released the same 
week (in this case, r=0) or up to three weeks before (-3≤r<0) or after (0<r≤3) the release 
of movie i. This variable takes into account both the number of rivals and their ability to 
capture attendance. All these independent variables were normalized by subtracting its 
mean, so the first-order coefficients can be interpreted as derivatives evaluated at the 
sample arithmetic mean. Our theoretical model suggests a decreasing effect when rival 
films are moved away from film i. Since competition effects may depend on the film i’s 
characteristics we split the sample using the MPAA rating and estimate equation (23) 
for three different groups: general, restricted audiences and others.
20  
  Note, in addition, that we  also include squared values of both  MaxThtsic and 
RivThts(r)ic to capture non-linear size and competition effects, respectively. Finally, we 
include weekly dummy variables (the first week is set as the base) to control for the 
effects of seasonality. A summary of the descriptive statistics for the above variables is 
shown in Table 1. 
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
 
5.  Estimation and Results 
  Equation (23) can be viewed as a panel data model. As is customary, it can be 
estimated using either a fixed effects or a random effects estimator.
21 Table 2 displays 
the results of both fixed effects and random effects estimations.  We provide  cluster-
robust standard errors, where clustering by films permits correlation of the errors within 
                                                 
19 Elberse and Eliashberg (2003) and Calantone et al. (2010) pointed out that the number of screens might 
be  considered  endogenous  because  exhibitors  might  allocate  screens  based  on  their  expectations 
regarding audience demand, and these expectations depend movie’s quality. Note, however, that we have 
included film-specific effects that accounts for this variation, and hence this endogeneity can be addressed 
using appropriate panel data estimators. 
20 The general audience group includes films suitable for all age groups and for children over 6 years. The 
restricted audience group includes films suitable only for ages over 17 years and the third group includes 
the remaining films, mainly those films not restricted to teenagers. 
21 We use an F test to test whether the film-specific constant terms (αi) are all equal. We obtain a value of 
5.61, which far exceeds any critical value of an F[2810, 11178]. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis 
in favour of the individual effects model. 15 
 
films  but  constrains  errors  to  be  independent  across  films.  According  to  the  robust 
Hausman  test,
22  we  reject  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  individ ual  effect  (αi)  and 
regressors are uncorrelated.
23 Thus, the fixed effects model is our preferred model as it 
allows  us  to  explain  market  shares  controlling  for  unobserved  differences  across 
movies. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
  The results in Table 2 show that the FE model explains nearly 35% of the market 
share variance. Most of the estimated first-order coefficients have their expected signs 
at the  sample mean. The first-order coefficient of the  maximum number of theaters 
where  the film was  exhibited (MaxThtsic)  is  positive  and  statistically  significant,  as 
expected. This result is in line with Calantone et al. (2010) and Elberse and Eliashberg 
(2003), though we provide evidence of a decreasing effect of MaxThtsic as the estimated 
second-order coefficient of this variable is negative and statistically significant. Hence, 
increasing  the  number  of  theatres  could  raise  the  box  office  performance  but  not 
indefinitely. 
  Generally speaking, the remaining first-order coefficients show that the presence 
of more (or stronger) past, contemporaneous and future competitors has a statistically 
significant and negative impact on market share. The positive values of the second-
order coefficients indicate, however, that the competition effect is decreasing with the 
number of rivals. Regarding the temporal pattern of the estimated competition effects, 
we have found, as expected, that contemporaneous rival movies have a stronger effect 
than films released in other weeks. This effect increases as rival film releases come 
closer. The results in Table 2 do not show evidence of a clear asymmetry between the 
effect of past and future film releases. The temporal pattern of competition effects will 
be discussed in more detail later in this section. 
  Our  theoretical  framework  in  Section  2  suggests  that  the  competition  effect 
strongly depends on movies’ characteristics, including their rating. Because films with 
different rating are aimed at different target audiences, one would expect a substantial 
difference  in  the  way  in  which  the  temporal  competition  affects  total  box-office 
revenues of films with different ratings. To examine this issue we have estimated our 
                                                 
22 We follow Cameron & Trivedi (2009), which use the method of Wooldridge (2002). 
23 The value for the F[16, 2810] statistic is 121.78, above any critical value; therefore we strongly rejects 
the null hypothesis that individual effects and explanatory variables are uncorrelated.  16 
 
model  for  three  groups  of  movies:  general,  restricted  audience  and  others.  The 
parameters estimated are shown in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
  Since  our  dataset  gives  us  information  on  this  variable,  we  have  decided  to 
replicate our model for three groups of movies (general, restricted audience and others) 
and analyse whether the competitive effects change significantly between them. The 
three models estimated have a similar goodness of fit, with the general audience model 
explaining  33%  of  the  market  share  variance,  the  model  for  restricted  audience 
explaining 41% while the figure is 35% for the other group model. As with the overall-
sample model in Table 2, the Hausman test allows us to reject the Random Effects 
estimator in each model. Again, most of the estimated coefficients retain the expected 
signs. The maximum number of theaters where a movie was exhibited (MaxThtsic) still 
has a positive and statistically significant effect on the market share in all models. This 
effect is again significantly decreasing.  
  Regarding the competition effect, the results are not as clear as those shown in 
Table  2,  because  both,  the  magnitude  and  statistical  significance  of  the  estimated 
parameters, vary across film groups. In general, the rival films that have a significant 
impact are only those released close to the film. The rival movies released the same 
week  have  a  significant,  negative  and  decreasing  effect  in  all  cases.  In  the  case  of 
general audience films, other harmful competitors are those that were released one week 
later. For restricted audience films, the more important rivals are those released the 
previous  week.  In  the  case  of  other  films,  rivals  released  two  weeks  later  have  a 
significant effect. 
  In order to  compare the magnitudes of the different  competition effects in a 
clearer way we have calculated the elasticities of the market shares taking into account 
the linear and the squared effects (see Table 4). All elasticities are evaluated at the mean 
of each group of movies. In this table we use the elasticity of the market share with 
respect to MaxThtsic as a benchmark to discuss the competition effects. In all models, 
the estimated elasticities relative to the maximum number of theaters are always higher 
than unity. This indicates that there are economies of scale at the mean, that is, you can 
take advantage of the size of the releases to some extent but the negative quadratic 
effects indicate that it will decrease as the film is released in more theatres. 17 
 
Regarding the competition effects, the most harmful rival films in all models are 
those films released the same week. However, the elasticity of the market share with 
respect to  contemporaneous rivals is always lower in absolute terms than one. This 
elasticity for all movies indicates that, at the mean, a 1% increase in contemporaneous 
rival theaters reduces box-office share by 0.22%. This effect is even more important for 
restricted audience films where the corresponding elasticity is twice as that found in the 
overall model (about 0.41). Using the elasticity  of the market share with respect to 
MaxThtsic as a benchmark, we conclude that the contemporaneous competition effect 
represents,  in  absolute  terms,  less  than  a  fifth  of  the  own-effect  of  theaters  for  the 
overall  model.  This  effect  goes  up  to  one  third  for  restricted  audience  films,  and 
decreases markedly for films not restricted to teenagers. 
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
In the case of the model that considers all movies, where the effects of both pre 
and post-released rivals are significant and negative, we get a decreasing impact as we 
move over time, i.e. the closer the release the higher the negative impact. It is also worth 
mentioning  that,  unlike  Table  2,  the  estimated  elasticities  in  Table  4  suggest  the 
existence of asymmetric effects on past and future film releases.  
  Comparing  the  estimations  of  the  different  rating  movie  groups,  it  the  same 
pattern  with  respect  to  the  impact  of  previous  or  subsequent  releases  is  no  longer 
appreciated. Market share is mainly affected by competitors launched before the own 
release for restricted films and those launched after for the other two groups of movies. 
Furthermore, the impacts caused by non-contemporary rivals are only comparable to 
contemporary films in the case of restricted films. 
Summarizing all these findings, it seems that the audience of non-restricted films 
is more interested in novelty since they are more affected by those films that will be 
new in the following weeks. However, the restricted movies’ audience could be more 
sensitive to a word-of-mouth effect related to previous released pictures. Following this, 
it seems that the releasing policy of restricted audience films should pay more attention 
to films already on exhibition whereas the distribution of other movies has to pay more 





6.  Conclusion 
  In this paper we show the role of temporal competition in the movie exhibition 
market  and  its  effect  on  market  share  taking  into  account  the  possible  differences 
between present, past and future films releases. We develop a theoretical model that 
allows us to shed light on this issue. The most significant outcome is that a competing 
movie released in the same week would always have a higher effect than that if it were 
released in any other week ceteris paribus. Moreover, rival films will have different 
impacts  depending  on  their  own  characteristics  as  well  as  their  temporal  pattern  of 
release. Therefore we can see that evaluating the final effect of competing films is an 
empirical issue.  
Taking  advantage  of  the  results  of  the  theoretical  model,  we  propose  an 
empirical application to examine our main research question. We use the information on 
the films released in five countries, where the geographical dimension allows us to use 
panel data techniques to control for the unobserved heterogeneity of the released films 
and  hence  capture  one  of  the  most  relevant  features  of  movie  market,  that  is,  the 
presence  of  highly  differentiated  products.  We  specifically  consider  the  competitors 
launched in the three week interval around the release date of a particular movie. We 
also  estimate  three  additional  models  splitting  the  films  sample  according  to  their 
ratings to get some distinctive effects by type of film, as suggested by the theoretical 
model.  
  In the main model, which considers all the movies, we found that the effect of 
contemporary rivals is always larger than the previous or future rivals, as suggested by 
the theoretical model. In general, we find a decreasing impact of other film releases as 
their  launch  dates  move  away  from  the  release  week  of  the  reference  film,  also 
confirming the findings of our theoretical model. 
When we compare the three additional models according to movies ratings, we 
found a substantial difference between them and different patterns with respect to the 
impact of previous or subsequent releases. Moreover, audiences of non-restricted films 
are more affected by movies that will be new in posterior weeks and thus they seem to 
be more interested in novelty. However, the restricted movies audience may be more 
sensitive to a word-of-mouth effect related to previously-released pictures. According to 
the above, the releasing policy should be different for the different types of films. In the 
case  of  an  expected  blockbuster,  restricted  audience  films  should  anticipate  rival 19 
 
releases and try to be launched before them, whereas general audience films and other 
films should postpone their release since it seems better to be released afterwards.  
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Table 1. Summary statistics of data 
 
   Data  Units     Mean     Min     Max     Std. Dev.    
   Market Share  percentage     0.003673     1.75E-08     0.113305     0.007205    
   Max. own theaters   thousands     0.453     0.001     4.393     0.820    
   Rivals theaters 0   thousands     1.816     0.000     15.387     2.426    
   Rivals theaters 1   thousands     2.034     0.000     15.388     2.599    
   Rivals theaters 2   thousands     2.045     0.000     15.388     2.600    
   Rivals theaters 3   thousands     2.032     0.000     15.388     2.566    
   Rivals theaters-1   thousands     2.061     0.000     15.388     2.611    
   Rivals theaters-2   thousands     2.036     0.000     15.388     2.551    
   Rivals theaters-3   thousands     2.047     0.000     15.388     2.597    
   23 
 
Table 2. Fixed effects and Random effects model 
      ln (MarketShare)     
                     Fixed effects model     Random effects model     
   Variable  Coefficient     robust-t     Coefficient     robust-t    
   MaxThts  3.0843  ***  46.03     4.1254  ***  68.04    
   RivThts 0  -0.1240  ***  -5.97     -0.2293  ***  -10.39    
   RivThts 1  -0.0664  ***  -3.26     -0.0924  ***  -4.33    
   RivThts 2  -0.0718  ***  -3.47     -0.0950  ***  -4.54    
   RivThts 3  -0.0429  **  -1.97     -0.0605  ***  -2.83    
   RivThts-1  -0.0737  ***  -3.38     -0.0864  ***  -3.90    
   RivThts-2  -0.0625  ***  -2.92     -0.0542  **  -2.51    
   RivThts-3  -0.0346     -1.55     -0.0384  *  -1.72    
   (MaxThts)^2  -0.8130  ***  -32.95     -1.1000  ***  -39.65    
   (RivThts 0)^2  0.0106  ***  4.12     0.0219  ***  8.32    
   (RivThts 1)^2  0.0020     0.88     0.0050  **  2.16    
   (RivThts 2)^2  0.0064  ***  2.89     0.0086  ***  3.89    
   (RivThts 3)^2  0.0034     1.29     0.0044  *  1.75    
   (RivThts-1)^2  0.0025     1.07     0.0032     1.34    
   (RivThts-2)^2  0.0064  ***  2.64     0.0047  *  1.94    
   (RivThts-3)^2  0.0017     0.72     0.0015     0.64    
   Weekly Dummies  yes           yes          
   Constant          -6.7885  ***  -67.91     -6.8456  ***  -64.42    
   N  11908           11908          
   R
2  0.3491                                    
   F  48.92                                    
  Hausman Test  121.78         
 
        
  
Note: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% 
level.    
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Table 3. Fixed effects model with movies for general, restricted audience and others 
         ln (MarketShare)     
                        FE (general audience)     FE (restricted)     FE (others)    
   Variable     Coefficient     robust-t     Coefficient     robust-t     Coefficient     robust-t    
   MaxThts     3.3081 ***  21.44     2.5862  ***  14.55     2.8611  ***  27.35    
   RivThts 0     -0.2265 ***  -5.22     -0.1802  ***  -3.80     -0.0828  **  -2.51    
   RivThts 1     -0.1158 ***  -2.82     -0.0566     -0.93     -0.0829  **  -2.36    
   RivThts 2     -0.0177    -0.40     -0.0254     -0.40     -0.0803  **  -2.32    
   RivThts 3     -0.0611    -1.36     -0.1245  **  -1.97     -0.0513     -1.35    
   RivThts-1     -0.0707    -1.53     -0.1370  **  -2.26     -0.0284     -0.79    
   RivThts-2     -0.0406    -0.93     -0.0323     -0.54     -0.0598     -1.61    
   RivThts-3     -0.0830 *  -1.80     0.0775     1.39     -0.0441     -1.19    
   (MaxThts)^2     -0.8440 ***  -18.98     -0.7810  ***  -11.52     -0.7180  ***  -19.55    
   (RivThts 0)^2     0.0231 ***  4.07     0.0173  ***  3.23     0.0051     1.26    
   (RivThts 1)^2     0.0057    1.27     0.0041     0.56     0.0006     0.16    
   (RivThts 2)^2     0.0034    0.62     0.0074     1.12     0.0075  **  2.00    
   (RivThts 3)^2     0.0115 **  2.18     0.0172  ***  2.68     0.0027     0.58    
   (RivThts-1)^2     0.0057    1.03     0.0048     0.73     -0.0027     -0.68    
   (RivThts-2)^2     0.0077    1.45     0.0006     0.10     0.0062     1.49    
   (RivThts-3)^2     0.0111 **  2.36     -0.0098  *  -1.73     0.0005     0.12    
   Weekly Dummies  yes           yes           yes           
   Constant             -7.20642 ***  -30.29     -7.00328  ***  -31.84     -6.80926     -39.15    
   N     4307           2193           5412          
   R
2     0.3329           0.4110           0.3528          
   F     10.96           6.44           16.93          
   Test Hausman    38.02        13.91        47.13        
   Note: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.          
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Table 4. Elasticities evaluated at mean 
∂(lnShareRev)/∂(lnX)                
Variable  η (all)  ratio  η (general 
audience)  ratio  η (restricted)  ratio  η (others)  ratio 
Max. own 
theaters  1.3809  ***  1.3065 ***  1.3916  ***  1.2687 *** 
Rivals theaters 0  -0.2220 ***  -0.1608  -0.2959 ***  -0.2265  -0.4128  ***  -0.2966  -0.1476  **  -0.1164 
Rivals theaters 1  -0.1340 ***  -0.0970  -0.1606 ***  -0.1229  -0.1496    -0.1075  -0.1716  **  -0.1353 
Rivals theaters 2  -0.1435 ***  -0.1039  -0.0288    -0.0221  -0.0105    -0.0075  -0.1605  **  -0.1265 
Rivals theaters 3  -0.0854  **  -0.0619  -0.0986    -0.0755  -0.2486  **  -0.1787  -0.1033    -0.0814 
Rivals theaters-1  -0.1505 ***  -0.1090  -0.1031    -0.0789  -0.4267  **  -0.3066  -0.0600    -0.0473 
Rivals theaters-2  -0.1239 ***  -0.0897  -0.0657    -0.0503  -0.1043    -0.0749  -0.1188    -0.0937 
Rivals theaters-3  -0.0699    -0.0506  -0.1271 *  -0.0973  0.1653    0.1188  -0.0918    -0.0724 
Note:  *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.    
 
 
 